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GIFT&-BANKING--GIFT OF JomT SAVINGS BANK DEPosrrs--A, the
mother of B, transferred three savings bank deposits from her sole account to the
account of "A or B-either or survivor." Two of the depositors' signature cards
contained this language: ''We hereby certify that this account and all moneys
to be credited to it belong to us as joint tenants, and will be the absolute property
of the survivor of us." There was evidence that one of the reasons for A's
transferring her deposits to the joint account was to enable B to draw money
therefrom for A while A was in the hospital. A retained sole possession of the
bank books and, upon her death intestate, B claimed as owner the balance in the
three joint accounts. Held, that the transfers of the accounts to A and B, jointly,
,did not constitute gifts to B, for there was no donative intent and there was no
surrender of control over the bank accounts to B. Rush 'U. Rush, (N.J. Eq.

1946) 49 A. (2d) 238.
Where money belonging to A is deposited in a savings bank account to ".A
or B" or to "A or B, or survivor," what are the rights of claimant B to the balance of the account upon the death of A? Various jurisdictions have sustained or
defeated B's right to the account upon four theories: joint tenancy,1 contract,2
trust,8 and gift. Statutes in many states, providing generally that if a bank
account is made payable to either of several joint depositors or the survivor,

1 A joint tenancy is found in the creation of the joint bank account, and B takes
as survivor. The difficulty of establishing a technical joint tenancy where the account
is in the name of "A or B" has not been discussed by most courts. Chippendale v.
North Adams Sav. Bank, :uz Mass. 499, III N.E. 371 (1916); Berkowitz's Estate,
344 Pa. 481, z6 A. (zd) z96 (194z).
2 The contractual relationship, as evidenced by the deposit form, or signature
card, is sometimes construed as making B a third party beneficiary of the contract
between A and the bank that the surviving co-depositor will be paid the deposit balance. In re Staver's Estate, 218 Wis. 114, _260 N.W. 655 (1935). Sometimes B's
right to the balance is based upon his standing as a promisee under the contract. New
Jersey Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Archibald, 91 N.J. Eq. 82, 108 A. 434 (1919).
8 In these cases B is usually considered as the beneficiary of a self-declaration of
trust by settlor, A. Murphy v. Haynes, 197 Ky. 444, 247 S.W. 362 (-1923); In re
Kellogg, 41 Cal. App. (2d) 833, 107 P. (2d) 964 (1940).
·
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payment to one will discharge the bank of all liability, have affected the interest
of B according to the particular statutory terms and their construction by the
· courts. 4 When the contest over the account proceeds upon a gift theory, tlie
courts almost uniformly measure the efficacy of the gift by the yardsticks of
donative intent and actual or symbolic delivery. 5 If the donor intends the gift to
take effect only upon his death, the courts have generally stricken' down the
transaction as an ineffective attempt to dispose of property in violation of the
statutes of wills,6 unless there is present the requisites of a valid gift causa mortis. 7
When a gift in praesenti is intended, the donor may desire to transfer a complete interest in the bank account to the donee, or he may intend a present gift
of a partial interest in the account with the enjoyment of the balance postponed until the donor's death. 8 The donative intent may ·be found in the statements and acts of the parties and other attendant circumstances. 9 It is usually
held that when only the fact of the deposit in the joint account appears, there is
no valid gift, for the transaction may have been eff~cted for the convenience of
A,10 or through A's ignorance of the meaning of a joint account,11 or to make a
testamentary gift to B upon A's death. 12 Some courts find a rebuttable presumption of a gift in the creation of a joint bank account when the co-depositors are
husband and wife.13 A donative intent is found by some courts, in the absence
of contrary evidence, in the language of the certificate of deposit or signature
4
The statute in the principal case provides in part: "When a deposit has been
made ••• in any bank .' .• in the names of two persons, payable to either or payable to
, either or to the survivor, the balance ... may be paid to either of said persons during
the life of both and in case of the death of either .•. the balance of the credit of said
account shall be paid to the survivor, and the legal representatives of the one dying
shall not have any claim or right thereto.••." N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 17:9-5. The
court interpreted this statute as affording protection to the bank in payment of moneys
deposited, rather than determining the survivor's right to the balance in the account.
The Michigan statute is discussed in Manufacturers Nat. Bank v. Schirmer, 303
Mich. 598, 6 N.W. (2d) 908 (1942), where it is said that the statute creates a rebuttable presumption of ownership to the balance in the survivor. See generally 103
A.L.R. 1123 (1936) and 149 A.L.R. 879 at 893 (1944).
11
7 AM. JuR., Banks,§ 427 (1937); 135 A.L.R. 993 (1941).
6
In re Gokey's Estate, 140 Misc. 779, 252 N.Y.S. 434 (1931); Hudson v.
Bradley, 176 Ark. 853, 4 S.W. (2d) 534 (1928).
7
A valid gift causa mortis must have been made in contemplation of death from
a present illness or some imminent peril. Thomas v. Houston, 181 N.C. 91, 106 S.E.
466 (1921).
8
25 M1cH. L. REv. 791 (1927); 7 AM. JuR., Banks,§ 430 (1937).
11
That the intention to make a gift must concur with the transfer of the account
to the co-depositors, see Hudson City Sav. Bank v. Havemeyer, 137 N.J. Eq. 145,
43 A. (2d) 834 (1945).
But see Kittridge v. Manning, 317 Mass. 689, 59 N.E. (2d) 261 (1945), where
a gift was sustained although the donative intent was manifested two years after the
joint account was established.
10
Principal case; Jones v. Ferguson, 150 Fla. 313, 7 S. (2d) 464 (1942).
11
Williams' Estate v. Tuch, 313 Ill. App. 230, 39 N.E. (2d) 695 (1942);
Lochinger v. Hanlon, 348 Pa. 29, 33 A. (2d) I (1943).
12
Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v: King, 58 Ariz. 477, 121 P. (2d) 429 (1942);
First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Huntley, 251 M.ich. 483, 232 N.W. 192 (1930).
18
In re Kane's Estate, 246 N.Y. 498, 159 N.E. 410 (1927).
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card; u in other jurisdictions even strong donative language in the form or the
account counts for nothing. 15 Generally the retention of a power of revocation
by the donor will not defeat an otherwise valid gift.16 There is much confusion
in the cases regarding the nature of the delivery requisite to sustain the gift.
Many courts state that the donor must strip himself completely of all ownership
over the account and surrender the pass book to the donee, but it is doubtful if,
in the presence of a clear donative intent, the rule is rigorously applied.17 If the
"complete surrender of control" test be applied, it is difficult to see how the
usual attempted gift of a partial interest in the account can be sustained. Yet the
majority of cases hold that the donor may vest a present right to a share in the
deposit in the donee through a gift.18 The rationale of these decisions seems to
be that since the thing given is a share in the account, the legal situation does
not .admit of literal compliance with the rule of complete divesting of control,
and the requirement is substantially fulfilled by the donor's placing the deposits within the joint control of both depositors.19 When a gift of the entire
account is intended, clearly there is less reason for a departure from the general
rule of complete delivery. Many of the contradictions found in the decisions,
even within the same jurisdictions, may be due to a failure to distinguish between an intended gift of ( 1) an entire and complete interest, and ( 2) a partial
interest, in the donor's bank deposits. It would seem that the inherent distinction between the two types of gifts should be recognized, so that delivery of the
bank book to the donee would be deemed essential in the former, and merely as
evidence bearing upon the intention of the parties in the latter.

Ira M. Price, II

14 Kennedy v. McMurray, 169 Cal. 287, 146 P. 647 (1915), where deposit
certificate stated that all money deposited belonged to A and B jointly. In Commercial
Trust Co. v. White, 99 N.J. Eq. 119, 132 A. 761 (1926), a donative intent was
found in a deposit certificate declaring that the account belonged to A and B as joint
tenants, to be the absolute property of the survivor, but no donative intent was discovered in a deposit certificate stating merely that A and B owned the account as joint
tenants,
15 7 AM, juR., Banks,§ 428 (1937); L.R.A. 1917 C 556.
18 McLeod v. Hennepin County Sav. Bank, 145 Minn. 299, 176 N.W. 987
(1920); Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926).
17 In Old Nat. Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Kendall, 14 Wash. (2d) 19, 126 P.
(2d) 603 (1942), the court, after stating the rule that to sustain a gift there must be
delivery such as will divest the donor of dominion over the property absolutely, sustained a gift where the donor used the pass book he had given the donee, to make
withdrawals for his own purposes. To the same effect, see Earnest v. Earnest, 26 Ala.
App. 260, 157 S. 885 (1934).
18 103 A.L.R. II23 (1936); 149 A.L.R. 879 (1944).
19 Beach v. Holland, 172 Ore. 396, 142 P. (2d) 990 (1943); First Nat. Bank
of Aurora v. Mulich, 83 Colo. 518, 266 P. IIIO (1928). It is sometimes said that
delivery of the pass book to the donor is a delivery to the donee.

